Madrid - 21-12-2012
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/ensayos/virus/mutantes/gripe/aviar/detienen/dias/elpepisoc/20120121elpepisoc_6/Tes
Tests with mutant viruses stop bird flu 60 days
The two teams that made these controversial experiments announced a moratorium - warned that the U.S. can be used in bioterrorism
ALICIA RIVERA - Madrid - 21/01/2012
The two scientific journals Nature and Science announced yesterday the suspension for 60 days of research involving hazardous mutant strains of H5N1 influenza virus. The two teams that made these controversial experiments took the voluntary moratorium in a letter signed by 39 researchers explain that, with this move, want to give time for discussion on the safety or the risk of his works, and recognizing the alarm arose around them. Scientists have made mutant strains of avian influenza virus to facilitate its transmission in ferrets as an animal model, in order to unravel the precise mechanisms of infection. This strain is highly lethal in humans but its transmission is very inefficient, ie it is very difficult to be transmitted as ordinary flu, but once caught, is very serious.
The news on other websitesWebsites in Spanishin other languages
The statement refers to the risk of flight, but not a criminal threat
"We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions to the challenges and opportunities arising from this work," the letter said. The sign Ron A. M. Fouchier (Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Holland), Adolfo García-Sastre (Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York), Yoshihiro Kawaoka (University of Tokyo) and 36 co-authors.
The declaration of the moratorium acknowledges the controversy about the risk of accidental release of the mutant strains, but did not allude to bioterrorism, ie the risk that the information on how to make those H5N1 strains may be useful for someone who I would like to make a criminal use of the data.
The controversy was triggered last December when the U.S. government, at the request of the National Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), asked the journals that publish only the general conclusions of these investigations with mutant strains of H5N1, but not the details of work done, to prevent its use in bioterrorism. Within the scientific community, many voices censorship and considered it a serious decision contrary to the practice of complete transparency of information, not only allow the progress of the investigation, but also check the results by repeating the same in other laboratories .
The controversial work, in short, consists in transforming the virus so that it is more contagious and reveal so poorly understood mechanisms of transmission of this pathogen. For some, the result is a biological pump, for others it is a necessary research to understand and prevent infection. That if these experiments are performed at maximum biosafety conditions and all necessary permits from the health authorities and scientists.
"Comparing the current threat of bioterrorism and our past experience with the flu threat, we might say that nature itself should be considered major bioterrorism," wrote Fouchier and two colleagues recently in Science. They recalled that the virus has killed millions of people worldwide without direct human assistance and that we must be ready for new outbreaks. Scientists now agree not to conduct any investigation for 60 days associated with strains "highly pathogenic" H5N1 "aimed at generating more transmissible viruses in mammals."
"The pause is welcome," said Michael Osterholm Nature, a member of the NSABB. But the moratorium is too short, says: "The 60 days will not be sufficient to establish and implement an international policy that works, do not think it's realistic."
The news on other websitesWebsites in Spanishin other languages
The statement refers to the risk of flight, but not a criminal threat
"We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions to the challenges and opportunities arising from this work," the letter said. The sign Ron A. M. Fouchier (Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Holland), Adolfo García-Sastre (Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York), Yoshihiro Kawaoka (University of Tokyo) and 36 co-authors.
The declaration of the moratorium acknowledges the controversy about the risk of accidental release of the mutant strains, but did not allude to bioterrorism, ie the risk that the information on how to make those H5N1 strains may be useful for someone who I would like to make a criminal use of the data.
The controversy was triggered last December when the U.S. government, at the request of the National Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), asked the journals that publish only the general conclusions of these investigations with mutant strains of H5N1, but not the details of work done, to prevent its use in bioterrorism. Within the scientific community, many voices censorship and considered it a serious decision contrary to the practice of complete transparency of information, not only allow the progress of the investigation, but also check the results by repeating the same in other laboratories .
The controversial work, in short, consists in transforming the virus so that it is more contagious and reveal so poorly understood mechanisms of transmission of this pathogen. For some, the result is a biological pump, for others it is a necessary research to understand and prevent infection. That if these experiments are performed at maximum biosafety conditions and all necessary permits from the health authorities and scientists.
"Comparing the current threat of bioterrorism and our past experience with the flu threat, we might say that nature itself should be considered major bioterrorism," wrote Fouchier and two colleagues recently in Science. They recalled that the virus has killed millions of people worldwide without direct human assistance and that we must be ready for new outbreaks. Scientists now agree not to conduct any investigation for 60 days associated with strains "highly pathogenic" H5N1 "aimed at generating more transmissible viruses in mammals."
"The pause is welcome," said Michael Osterholm Nature, a member of the NSABB. But the moratorium is too short, says: "The 60 days will not be sufficient to establish and implement an international policy that works, do not think it's realistic."
投稿
0 件のコメント:
コメントを投稿