Madrid - 20-01-2012
http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/01/20/actualidad/1327086964_022678.html
Slowdown in the experiments with mutant virus of bird flu
The two teams that made these controversial experiments announced a moratorium of 60 days
U.S. warned of the danger that this work be used by bioterrorists
The virus that opened a flood of alerts, EMILIO DE BENITO
Alicia Rivera Madrid 20 ENE 2012 - 23:03 CET
The two leading scientific journals Nature and Science simultaneously announced the suspension for 60 days, of research involving hazardous mutant strains of H5N1 influenza virus. The two independent groups were making these controversial experiments assume the voluntary moratorium in a letter signed by the researchers (39 in total) explaining that, with this move, want to give time for discussion on the safety or risk that may involve their work, and acknowledge the alarm arose around them.
Scientists have constructed mutant strains of avian influenza viruses by genetic engineering to facilitate the transmission of the same in ferrets as animal model, in order to unravel the precise mechanisms of infection. This strain is highly lethal in humans but its transmission is very inefficient, ie it is very difficult to be transmitted as ordinary flu, but once caught, is very serious.
"We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for the challenges and opportunities arising from this work," they write in the letter. Sign the declaration Ron A. M. Fouchier (Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Holland), Adolfo García-Sastre (Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York), Yoshihiro Kawaoka (University of Tokyo) and 36 co-authors.
Scientists have made mutant strains of the virus to facilitate ease of transmission in ferrets
The declaration of the moratorium of two months, scientists recognize the controversy about the risk of accidental release of its mutant strains of the virus but do not mention bioterrorism, ie the risk that the information on the construction of these forms H5N1 mutants could be useful for someone who intends to make a criminal use of data, such as raised levels of government, especially in the U.S., but also in the World Health Organization.
The controversy was triggered last December when the U.S. government, at the request of the National Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), asked the journals that publish only the general conclusions of these investigations with mutant strains of H5N1, but not the details of the work. Within the scientific community, many voices censorship and considered it a serious decision contrary to the scientific practice of complete transparency of information, not only allow the progress of the investigation, but also check the results by repeating the same in other laboratories.
Themselves signatories of the letter of the moratorium explain their work. The two groups, one at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and one at the Erasmus Medical Center, "have shown that viruses that have a specific protein of H5N1 could become transmissible in ferrets." The research, in short, is to transform the virus so that it is contagious and reveal so poorly understood mechanisms of transmission of this pathogen. For some, the result is a biological pump, for others it is a necessary research to unravel the processes of contagion. That if all these experiments are being conducted in high biosafety conditions (special laboratories to avoid any leakage of the deadly strain) and all necessary permits from the health authorities and scientists.
The publication of results without details is censorship, according to many scientists
So yesterday I remembered Fouchier and two of his colleagues at Erasmus Medical Center in an article published on the website of Science, explaining why these investigations are necessary and defending scientific publication. "We disagree with the recommendations of the NSABB. However, we have respected their advice, "the scientists wrote, expressing his hope of finding a solution to all in order to present the key information is useful and who, in turn, protect it from those who might misuse it. They also stated that these investigations are not new methods or technologies used but that all procedures are available in the literature.
"Comparing the current threat of bioterrorism and our past experience with the flu threat, we might say that nature itself should be considered major bioterrorism," they wrote Fouchier and his two colleagues. They added that the natural reservoir emerging viruses have killed millions of people worldwide without direct human aid and must be prepared for new ones, such as avian flu, SARS or HIV.
One day later, these scientists accept and announce the moratorium to allow time to find a solution to the problem. Undertake not to conduct any investigation for 60 days related "Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza aimed at generating more transmissible viruses in mammals." Only continue their studies on the natural transmission of this virus.
"The pause is welcome," said Michael Osterholm to Nature, director of Center for Infectious Diseases at the University of Minneapolis (USA) and member of the NSABB. But in his opinion, the moratorium is too short. "Surely the 60 days will not suffice to establish and implement an international policy that works, do not think it's realistic." In addition, he notes, the statement does not mention voluntary moratorium on publication of results of work.
The controversy is postponed, but remains open.
The virus that opened a flood of alerts
EMILIO DE BENITO
The avian influenza virus is guilty of many things. It was, when it appeared in 2003 in Southeast Asia, the first major alert, and affected health actions in the last decade.
The cause was, first, ignorance. And immediately, the fear that the H5N1 mutates and combines the two worst possibilities (it is understood that for humans, not the virus, whose success is the spread) that was highly lethal and easily transmitted.
So far, only confirmed the first one. To date, the World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 581 human cases spread across 15 countries, of which 342 have died. This gives a mortality rate of about 60%, which, if I had a virus as the seasonal flu, would be a slaughter of millions of people around the world.
Although no one listen to him, the virus has not disappeared. This year, three people are infected (Egypt, Indonesia and Cambodia), of which the last two have died.
Another thing has been its impact on birds. In the absence of a vaccine, each outbreak is to be sacrificed to all the farm to prevent the virus from spreading.
But perhaps now seen, the more damage the virus has been on the citizens' trust in health systems, particularly the WHO. In 2003 and especially 2004, the fear of the spread caused a massive purchase of antivirals (it was when it became known as Tamiflu). Drugs were certainly not lacking. There have been only isolated cases (in Turkey, Vietnam and Indonesia) suspected human transmission, but then the process has not been extended.
That memory was the one who made two years ago when there was another virus, H1N1 transmitting itself easily jump back to the alarms. Again, fortunately without consequences.
It's not that scientists are more fearful than the rest of the population. More than 20 years does not appear a deadly epidemic of influenza. And so, each new specimen is observed under the microscope. Less and less interest, certainly. For example there is another new virus circulating in the United States, a mixture of three, and this time, as in the fable of Peter and the wolf, no one has called the alarm.
Only one person seems to have been maintained to date, immune to the effect of successive alerts frustrated: WHO director Margaret Chan, who has been relegated to 2017.
Scientists have constructed mutant strains of avian influenza viruses by genetic engineering to facilitate the transmission of the same in ferrets as animal model, in order to unravel the precise mechanisms of infection. This strain is highly lethal in humans but its transmission is very inefficient, ie it is very difficult to be transmitted as ordinary flu, but once caught, is very serious.
"We realize that organizations and governments around the world need time to find the best solutions for the challenges and opportunities arising from this work," they write in the letter. Sign the declaration Ron A. M. Fouchier (Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, Holland), Adolfo García-Sastre (Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York), Yoshihiro Kawaoka (University of Tokyo) and 36 co-authors.
Scientists have made mutant strains of the virus to facilitate ease of transmission in ferrets
The declaration of the moratorium of two months, scientists recognize the controversy about the risk of accidental release of its mutant strains of the virus but do not mention bioterrorism, ie the risk that the information on the construction of these forms H5N1 mutants could be useful for someone who intends to make a criminal use of data, such as raised levels of government, especially in the U.S., but also in the World Health Organization.
The controversy was triggered last December when the U.S. government, at the request of the National Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), asked the journals that publish only the general conclusions of these investigations with mutant strains of H5N1, but not the details of the work. Within the scientific community, many voices censorship and considered it a serious decision contrary to the scientific practice of complete transparency of information, not only allow the progress of the investigation, but also check the results by repeating the same in other laboratories.
Themselves signatories of the letter of the moratorium explain their work. The two groups, one at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and one at the Erasmus Medical Center, "have shown that viruses that have a specific protein of H5N1 could become transmissible in ferrets." The research, in short, is to transform the virus so that it is contagious and reveal so poorly understood mechanisms of transmission of this pathogen. For some, the result is a biological pump, for others it is a necessary research to unravel the processes of contagion. That if all these experiments are being conducted in high biosafety conditions (special laboratories to avoid any leakage of the deadly strain) and all necessary permits from the health authorities and scientists.
The publication of results without details is censorship, according to many scientists
So yesterday I remembered Fouchier and two of his colleagues at Erasmus Medical Center in an article published on the website of Science, explaining why these investigations are necessary and defending scientific publication. "We disagree with the recommendations of the NSABB. However, we have respected their advice, "the scientists wrote, expressing his hope of finding a solution to all in order to present the key information is useful and who, in turn, protect it from those who might misuse it. They also stated that these investigations are not new methods or technologies used but that all procedures are available in the literature.
"Comparing the current threat of bioterrorism and our past experience with the flu threat, we might say that nature itself should be considered major bioterrorism," they wrote Fouchier and his two colleagues. They added that the natural reservoir emerging viruses have killed millions of people worldwide without direct human aid and must be prepared for new ones, such as avian flu, SARS or HIV.
One day later, these scientists accept and announce the moratorium to allow time to find a solution to the problem. Undertake not to conduct any investigation for 60 days related "Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza aimed at generating more transmissible viruses in mammals." Only continue their studies on the natural transmission of this virus.
"The pause is welcome," said Michael Osterholm to Nature, director of Center for Infectious Diseases at the University of Minneapolis (USA) and member of the NSABB. But in his opinion, the moratorium is too short. "Surely the 60 days will not suffice to establish and implement an international policy that works, do not think it's realistic." In addition, he notes, the statement does not mention voluntary moratorium on publication of results of work.
The controversy is postponed, but remains open.
The virus that opened a flood of alerts
EMILIO DE BENITO
The avian influenza virus is guilty of many things. It was, when it appeared in 2003 in Southeast Asia, the first major alert, and affected health actions in the last decade.
The cause was, first, ignorance. And immediately, the fear that the H5N1 mutates and combines the two worst possibilities (it is understood that for humans, not the virus, whose success is the spread) that was highly lethal and easily transmitted.
So far, only confirmed the first one. To date, the World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 581 human cases spread across 15 countries, of which 342 have died. This gives a mortality rate of about 60%, which, if I had a virus as the seasonal flu, would be a slaughter of millions of people around the world.
Although no one listen to him, the virus has not disappeared. This year, three people are infected (Egypt, Indonesia and Cambodia), of which the last two have died.
Another thing has been its impact on birds. In the absence of a vaccine, each outbreak is to be sacrificed to all the farm to prevent the virus from spreading.
But perhaps now seen, the more damage the virus has been on the citizens' trust in health systems, particularly the WHO. In 2003 and especially 2004, the fear of the spread caused a massive purchase of antivirals (it was when it became known as Tamiflu). Drugs were certainly not lacking. There have been only isolated cases (in Turkey, Vietnam and Indonesia) suspected human transmission, but then the process has not been extended.
That memory was the one who made two years ago when there was another virus, H1N1 transmitting itself easily jump back to the alarms. Again, fortunately without consequences.
It's not that scientists are more fearful than the rest of the population. More than 20 years does not appear a deadly epidemic of influenza. And so, each new specimen is observed under the microscope. Less and less interest, certainly. For example there is another new virus circulating in the United States, a mixture of three, and this time, as in the fable of Peter and the wolf, no one has called the alarm.
Only one person seems to have been maintained to date, immune to the effect of successive alerts frustrated: WHO director Margaret Chan, who has been relegated to 2017.
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